This paper builds a small open economy trade model where there is pollution from the production and consumption of goods. In the presence of production and consumption pollution, we examine a piecemeal consumer-price-neutral reform of the tariff and consumption tax and a piecemeal producer-price-neutral reform of the export and production taxes on a specific good. The paper identifies sufficient conditions under which the above tax reforms improve welfare and increase government tax revenues.
Introduction
During the past couple of decades, there is a general consensus regarding the reform of national tax systems. International institutions such as the GATT/WTO, the IMF and the World Bank have been encouraging governments to reform their indirect tax structures requiring the reliance for raising public sector revenues primarily on taxes such as income taxes, consumption taxes, and VATs, rather than on trade taxes.
Such tax reforms, however, are likely to reduce government revenues for many LDCs which historically have relied on trade taxes for their tax revenues. In light of such undesirable revenue implications of the proposed indirect tax reforms, designing tax reform strategies which improve welfare without, however, eroding government tax revenues has been an important issue both in theoretical research and in policy agendas.
Motivated by such considerations, a theoretical literature identifies sufficient conditions under which reducing trade taxes and increasing domestic taxes, improves welfare and either retains constant or increases government tax revenues, e.g., see, Michael et al. (1993) , Hatzipanayotou et al. (1994) , Keen and Lighthart (2002) , Emran (2005) , Naito (2006) , and Naito and Abe (2008) . 1 Many production and consumption activities entail the emission of environmentally harmful pollutants which affect negatively households' welfare. Tax policies affect the aggregate levels of pollution due to their effects on economic activity, and thus, tax reform policies traditionally viewed as welfare improving and revenue increasing may not be able to achieve these objectives due to the presence of pollution. A strand of literature has extensively examined the relationship among expanding economic activity, growing volumes of international trade and environmental quality. Yet, only a few studies address the welfare implications of tax 1 Kreickemeier and Raimondos-Møller (2008) examine whether a consumer-price-neutral uniform reduction in tariffs and increase in consumption taxes improves the market access of a small open economy. Moreover, they note that such a reform scheme is less efficient; both in terms of welfare and market access considerations, compared to a reform of only tariffs (e.g., see Ju and Krishna, 2000) . For the welfare and market access implications of tariff reforms, see, among others, Anderson and Neary (2007) .
2 reforms in the presence of pollution generated from production or consumption activities. Most of the studies, in doing so, abstract from government revenue considerations, e.g., Copeland (1994) , Beghin et al. (1997) , Turunen-Red and Woodland (2004) . Notable exceptions, within a static general equilibrium framework, are Beghin and Dessus (1999) , and Naito (2005) in a dynamic framework of an open economy.
The strand of the literature that examines the welfare implications of tax reforms in the presence of production or consumption generated pollution, has not considered at all either consumer-price-neutral or producer-price-neutral indirect tax reforms of the type considered by, among others, Keen and Lighthart (2002), Emran (2005) . These type of reforms in domestic and trade taxes are viewed as a very practical tax reform strategies which yield, in the absence of pollution, as clear-cut and unambiguously beneficial welfare and tax revenue results, as one can hope for, e.g., see Keen and Lighthart (2002) ). 2 With these results at hand, one may ponder whether such clear cut conclusions continue to hold in the presence of production and consumption pollution.
To address this issue, we construct a general equilibrium model of a small open economy producing many traded goods, whose production and consumption generates pollution that adversely affect households' utility. The country's structure of indirect taxes consists of trade, production and consumption taxes. We consider two types of indirect tax reforms. A consumer-price-neutral reform whereby we reduce the tariff rate on a given good and equally increase its consumption tax, leaving its consumer price unchanged. A producer-price-neutral reform whereby we reduce the export tax on a given good and equally increase its production tax, leaving its producer price unchanged. For better analytical interpretation of the results, our analysis unfolds as follows. We first consider the existence of only production pollution and we examine the welfare and tax revenue implications of the piecemeal consumer-price-neutral and producer-price-neutral reforms in domestic and trade taxes. Next, we allow only for consumption pollution, and we perform similar analysis of the indirect tax reforms as in the case of only production pollution.
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The Model
Consider a small open, perfectly competitive economy, which produces and The economy has a number of identical households which consume the K commodities, whose utility is adversely affected by production and consumption pollution. A representative household's preferences are captured by the expenditure function ( , , , ) E q z r u denoting the minimum expenditure on goods achieving a level of utility () u , at consumer price vector
, and the levels of production and consumption pollutants z and r , respectively . The ( , , , ) E q z r u function is increasing 
u E E u    denotes the reciprocal of the marginal utility of income. 7 Beghin et al. (1997) 8 When pollution is generated from production, our vector of production taxes () s is equivalent to the vector of pollution taxes () s in Copeland (1994) . When pollution is generated from consumption, consumption taxes () t are equivalent to pollution taxes. prime ()  denotes a transposed vector or matrix.The country's income-expenditure identity requires that private spending on goods must equal income from production plus income from tax revenue. That is, ( , , , ) ( ) E q z r u R p T  .
Equations (1) and (2) are the main equations of the model, used to examine the effects of indirect tax reform. In the analysis to follow, two reform programs are considered. First, we examine a piecemeal tax reform entailing a simultaneous small increase in the consumption tax and a decrease in the import tariff on a specific commodity, so that its consumer price is held constant. This we call a "consumerprice-neutral" indirect tax reform. Second, we examine a piecemeal tax reform entailing a simultaneous small increase in the production tax and a decrease in the export tax on a specific commodity, so that its producer price is held constant. This we call a "producer-price-neutral" indirect tax reform. We consider these reforms in the case where only production pollution exists, and when we have only consumption pollution.
Piecemeal reform of trade and domestic taxes under production pollution
We consider the case where consumption is "clean", i.e., 0 j jK     , and only production generates pollution. The aggregate level of pollution in the economy
Consumer-price-neutral reforms of tariffs and consumption taxes
The government pursues a consumer-price-neutral reform policy by simultaneously reducing tariffs and increasing consumption taxes by the same amount, i.e., 0 dt d  , so that consumer prices remain constant, i.e., 0 dq  . Export and production taxes are held constant. Equations (1) and (2) yield the following changes in tax revenue and welfare:
where qu E is a vector whose all elements are positive, assuming that all goods are normal in consumption and We first examine the welfare and tax revenue implications of what we call the consumer-price-neutral piecemeal reform of a tariff and a consumption tax. That is, the tax reform program which calls for simultaneously reducing the tariff and increasing the consumption tax on the th k imported good so that its consumer price remains constant, i.e., 0 (4) and the above conditions, the welfare effect of the consumer-priceneutral tax reform is given as follows:
Equation (5) can be further elaborated on by using the properties of the revenue function, i.e., output supply functions are homogeneous of degree zero in prices. 9 The positive sign of  is justified in various ways. Here 1   is the tax multiplier, equivalent to the socalled tariff multiplier, for example in Copeland (1994) , Neary and Ruane (1988) . A negative multiplier would imply that an increase in lump-sum taxes on consumers would raise utility. Alternatively, by the homogeneity of degree one of the expenditure function in consumer prices,
, and is positive since all goods are assumed normal in consumption, e.g., 
, and by the reciprocity conditions we have
Using the above properties in equation (5), the welfare effect of the proposed consumer-price-neutral tax reform, is given as follows:
where ,,
. We call Equation (6) indicates that the proposed consumer-price-neutral reduction in the tariff rate on the th k good increases social welfare if, first, the th k good is a substitute in production with all other goods. Second, the rate of excess taxation of production pollution of the th k good is the lowest, either positive or negative rate. Intuitively, since a tariff is a production subsidy and a consumption tax, then reducing the tariff rate on the th k good and equally increasing its consumption tax, leaves its consumer price unchanged, reduces the production subsidy and thus the producer's price of this good decreases. Production of the th k good falls and that of all other goods increases since we assume that goods are substitutes in production. Since the th k good whose production decreases has the lowest rate of excess taxation of production pollution () k  , the proposed reform raises its rate of excess taxation of production pollution, and increases social welfare. Thus, the proposed reform causes welfare to increase if it brings towards uniformity the rates of excess taxation of production pollution.
The effect of the consumer-price-neutral reform on the level of production pollution is as follows:
Equation (7) indicates that the sufficient conditions for the consumer-price-neutral reduction in the tariff rate on the k th good to reduce the level of production pollution, (6)- (8) 
. Thus, if the th k imported good has the lowest tax impact factor and the highest rate of pollution per unit of output as a fraction of its producer price, then it also carries the lowest rate of excess taxation of production pollution. But, when a good carries the lowest rate of excess taxation of production pollution, it does not necessarily mean that it also has the lowest tax impact factor and the highest pollution per unit of output as a fraction of its producer price. Therefore, given the substitutability assumption, the conditions that the th k imported good has the lowest tax impact factor and the highest rate of pollution per unit of output as a fraction of its producer price, are sufficient but not necessary for the consumer-price-neutral decrease in the tariff rate on the th k good to increase the government tax revenue and welfare. Consider for example the special case where production taxes are zero and goods and pollution are independent in consumption. In this case, given the substitutability assumption, by decreasing the tariff rate on the good with the highest tariff rate (i.e., highest production subsidy) and the highest pollution per unit of output as a fraction of its producer price, increases welfare and revenue.
Corollary 1: The tax reform suggested in Proposition 1 increases both social welfare and total tax revenue if the th k good carries the lowest tax impact factor and the highest pollution per unit of output as a fraction of its producer price.
The above results can be compared to related results of the tax reform literature in the absence of pollution. For example, assuming substitutability of goods in production, Keen and Ligthart (2002) , Corollary 1.c, demonstrate that reducing the highest tariff rate and increasing the consumption tax on the same good so that its consumer price remains constant, improves welfare and raises government revenues.
This reform entails an increase in the lowest net production tax and brings towards uniformity the net production taxes. In our analysis, again under the assumption of substitutability of goods in production, the proposed welfare improving, revenue increasing consumer-price-neutral reform of tariffs and consumption taxes requires lowering the tariff rate and equally increasing the consumption tax on the good exhibiting the lowest rate of excess taxation of production pollution and the lowest tax impact factor and bring these rates towards uniformity. This rates account not only for the net production taxes, but also for the change in consumption tax revenue due to changes in pollution and consumption of goods, for the pollution generated per unit of output and for the households' marginal willingness to pay for reducing the pollution generated from its production.
Producer-price neutral reforms of production and export taxes
Now, continuing to assume the existence of only production pollution, we examine the welfare and tax revenue implications of a producer-price-neutral reform by simultaneously reducing export taxes and increasing production taxes by the same amount, i.e., 0 d ds   , so that producer prices are held constant, i.e., 0 dp  . Since producer prices remain constant, the level of production pollution does not change.
Tariffs and consumption taxes remain unchanged. Using equations (1) and (2), we get
, and (9)
A piecemeal producer-price-neutral reform of production and export taxes entails the increase in the production tax on a certain exported commodity, e.g., 0 k ds  , and of simultaneously reducing its export tax, i.e., 0 k d  , so that its producer price is held constant, i.e., 0
13 Using equations (9) and (10) and the zero homogeneity properties of the compensated demand functions in prices, i.e.,
, after some manipulations, the welfare and tax revenue effects of this reform are given as follows: Since, due to the producer-price-neutral reform, production of goods and thus production generated pollution remain unchanged, the conditions for welfare improvement and revenue increase described above are the same as the ones we get in the absence of any pollution. Specifically, in a model without pollution, Keen and Ligthart (2002) , consider the producer-price-neutral reform in export and production taxes and note that such a reform increases welfare and public revenue if the increased consumer prices reduce the value of compensated demand at world prices, and all goods are Hicksian substitutes.
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The following proposition summarizes the findings of this section: 
good and a small increase in its production tax, leaving its producer price unchanged, improves social welfare and increases tax revenues if it carries the lowest net consumption tax as a fraction of its consumer price.
In closing the analysis of this section, it is worth noting two interesting findings in the present context with production pollution. First, from proposition 1, the welfare increase is a necessary condition for a consumer-price-neutral piecemeal reform of a tariff and a consumption tax to increase tax revenues. This condition is not needed for a producer-price-neutral piecemeal reform in an export and production taxes to raise tax revenues (proposition 2). Second, in the absence of consumption pollution, whether or not production is "clean" activity bears no impact, relative to the standard results of the literature without pollution, on the welfare and tax revenue implications of a piecemeal reform in export and production taxes.
Piecemeal reforms of trade and domestic taxes under consumption pollution
We consider the case where production is "clean", i.e., 
Consumer-price-neutral reforms of tariffs and consumption taxes
The government pursues a consumer-price-neutral reform policy by simultaneously reducing tariffs and increasing consumption taxes by the same amount so that consumer prices remain constant. Export and production taxes remain unchanged. Equations (1) and (2), yield the following changes in tax revenue and welfare.
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where,    is an "augmented" tax multiplier adjusted for the presence of consumption pollution and of domestic and trade taxes (see footnote 9).
17
We first examine the welfare and tax revenue implications of a consumerprice-neutral piecemeal reform of a tariff and a consumption tax. It entails the simultaneous reduction of the tariff rate and the equal increase of the consumption tax on the th k imported good so that its consumer price remains constant, i.e., 0
Using equations (13)- (14) and the above assumptions, the welfare and tax revenue effects of the consumer-price-neutral tax reform, after some algebraic manipulations, are given as follows: (1) and (2) we obtain equations (13)  being negative, an increase in income and consumption would result to a lower level of consumption generated pollution. 17 In this case, for given taxes, producer and consumer prices, using equation (1) and (2) in pollution to reduce welfare. Thus the assumptions that goods i) are normal in consumption, ii) an increase in consumption of goods increases pollution and iii) the increase in pollution reduces welfare (given everything else) are sufficient conditions for Δ to be positive. From equations (15) and (16) we get the following proposition. 
good and a small increase in its consumption tax, leaving its consumer price unchanged, improves social welfare and increases tax revenues if it carries the lowest net production tax as a fraction of its producer price.
Proposition 3 implies that the existence of consumption pollution alone does not affect the sufficient conditions of the standard literature without pollution, for a piecemeal consumer-price-reform of tariffs and consumption taxes to be welfareimproving and tax revenue-enhancing. The reasoning for this result is the following.
The consumer-price neutral reduction in the tariff rate on the k th good does not change the consumer prices and thus the consumption of goods and pollution is not directly affected. The increase in welfare, however, caused by this reform, increases consumption of goods which indirectly increases pollution. In terms of equations (15) and (16), this indirect effect is imbedded in the expressions for Ω,  and .
 Thus, while the sufficient conditions for welfare and revenue increase are not affected by the presence of pollution, the magnitude of these reforms on welfare and tax revenue is different in the two cases since the presence of pollution affects the size of Ω,  and .
 Note that under our assumptions and assuming that everything else is the same, we have that    . Thus, the augmented, due to pollution, tax multiplier 1   is smaller compared to the tax multiplier 1   for the non-pollution case. Therefore, in the 18 Equation (16) emerges after using equation (15) into (13), and applying the principle of the proposed consumer-price-neutral piecemeal reform.
presence of pollution and assuming that everything else is the same, the impact of the tax reform policy on welfare is of a smaller magnitude compared to the impact of the same size reform in the non-pollution case.
Producer-price-neutral reforms of export and production taxes
Now we examine the welfare and tax revenue implications of a producerprice-neutral reform by simultaneously reducing export taxes and increasing production taxes by the same amount, i.e., 0 d ds   , so that producer prices are held constant, i.e., 0 dp  . Equations (1) and (2) 
The algebra of equations (17) and (18) is extremely cumbersome and the emerging results far from intuitively revealing of the impact of this reform policy on the country's welfare and tax revenues. To facilitate the analysis we assume that goods and clean environment are independent in consumption. 20 Then, equations (17) and (18) reduce to:
where
is assumed positive.
19 In this case,
these expressions into equations (1) and (2), after some algebra we obtain equations (17) and (18). 20 The assumption that the demand for goods is independent of the environmental quality is often made in the literature (i.e., Bovenberg 1999, Beghin and Dessus 1999) . In the analysis to follow we assume 0 Wilson (1991) considers an example of a direct utility function and Copeland and Taylor (2004) an example of an indirect utility function by which ordinary, not compensated, demand functions for goods are independent of public good and pollution, respectively. Lahiri and Raimondos-Møller (1998) discuss the implications of zero income effects on the non-numeraire commodity and of the separability between private and public goods in consumption. Hatzipanayotou et al. (2008) also discuss the (non-) separability between private goods and clean environment in consumption.
Using equations (19)- (20) 
, (21) where Intuitively, since the export tax is a production tax and consumption subsidy, then by reducing the export tax on the th k good and equally increasing its production tax, leaves its producer price constant, reduces the consumption subsidy, increases its consumer price and reduces its consumption. Production of all goods remains unchanged, while the higher consumer price of the th k exported good causes the consumption of all other goods to increase since are assumed substitutes in consumption. The th k exported good has the lowest rate of excess taxation of consumption pollution and the above changes causes this rate to increase, resulting in total welfare increase.
Using equations (19)- (20) , and the homogeneity properties of the expenditure function, changes in the level of government revenue, due to the proposed tax reform program, are given as follows:
Thus, if a good has the lowest net consumption tax and the highest pollution per unit of consumption as a fraction of its consumer price, then it also has the lowest rate of excess taxation of consumption pollution. Note that the reverse is not necessarily true. Therefore, besides the substitutability conditions, sufficient but not necessary conditions for the producer-price-neutral decrease in the export tax on the th k good to increase the tax 18 revenue and welfare are that the k th good has the lowest net consumption tax and the highest pollution per unit of output as a fraction of its consumer price. 21 Consider, for example, the special case where consumption taxes are zero. In this case, given the substitutability assumption, the producer-price-neutral decrease in the export tax on the good with the highest export tax (i.e., highest consumption subsidy and thus lowest net consumption tax) and the highest pollution per unit of consumption as a fraction of its consumer price, increases welfare and revenue. 
Concluding Remarks
This paper derives sufficient conditions under which piecemeal reforms in trade and domestic taxes improve welfare and increase government tax revenues in the presence of pollution. In the presence of production or consumption pollution, the piecemeal reforms we consider here are (i) a consumer-price-neutral reform of reducing tariffs and increasing consumption taxes, and (ii) a producer-price-neutral reform of reducing export taxes and increasing production taxes. The propositions of the paper summarize the conditions that are needed for the above reforms to increase welfare and government revenues. These conditions, on the one hand, contain certain relationships, as the standard tax reform literature, e.g., substitutability in production or consumption between the imported or exported good whose taxes are reformed, to all other goods. On the other hand, they contain conditions resulting from the presence of production and or consumption generated pollution, e.g., the rates of excess taxation of production or consumption pollution and the tax impact factor of a good. These rates of excess taxation and the tax impact factors, in addition to the indirect tax structure consisting of both trade and domestic taxes, depend also on the 21 It can be easily shown that in the presence of only consumption pollution, the effect of the producer- . Thus, the reform that increases welfare may also increase pollution. Therefore, the conditions that the th k good (i) is a substitute to all other goods in consumption and (ii) it carries the highest rate of pollution per unit of consumption as a fraction of its consumer price, is necessary but not sufficient for the welfare improving reform to reduce pollution.
relationship between goods and clean environment in consumption, on the pollution per unit of output produced or consumed and the marginal welfare damage caused by the pollution created from the consumption or production of the good whose taxes are reformed.
While in some cases the presence of pollution does affect the welfare improving and revenue increasing sufficient conditions of a proposed piecemeal tax reform, in some other cases it does not. For example, the presence of production pollution affects the sufficient conditions for a welfare improving and revenue enhancing consumer-price-neutral reform. It does not affect, however, the corresponding sufficient conditions of a producer-price-neutral reform of export and production taxes. Similarly, the presence of consumption pollution does not affect the sufficient conditions for a consumer-price-neutral piecemeal reform of a tariff and a consumption tax to be welfare improving and revenue enhancing, even though the magnitude of the impact of these reforms on welfare and revenue is affected. The presence of consumption pollution, however, affects the conditions needed for a producer-price-neutral reform to increase welfare and revenue.
Finally, from a policy view point, we may argue that, in the presence of production or consumption pollution, our analysis identifies sufficient conditions in selecting the commodities for which taxes should be adjusted in the pursuit of welfare and tax revenue increasing reforms. For example, in the presence of consumption pollution, implementing a producer-price-neutral tax reforms one should aim at reducing the export tax on the good with the lowest net consumption tax (i.e., highest export tax when consumption taxes are zero) and the highest pollution per unit of consumption as a fraction of its consumer price. In the presence of production pollution, when implementing a consumer price neutral reform, one should aim at reducing the tariff rate on the good with the lowest tax impact factor (i.e., highest tariff rate when consumption taxes are zero and goods and pollution are independent in consumption) and the highest pollution per unit of output as a fraction of its producer price.
